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Road Expansion and Market Integration
in the Austrian Low Countries
during the Second Half of the 18th Century
Abstract. We analyse the integration of wheat markets across 18 towns in the Austrian Low
Countries during the second half of the 18th century and their relationship to the rapidly expan-
ding paved-road network during this period. Through the use of a switching regression
approach (threshold cointegration), we study the long-term and short-term integration of these
markets using monthly wheat prices. We find that throughout this period, markets were spa-
tially interconnected. However, price margins responded slowly to local shocks. We also find
that transaction costs were relatively high. The results suggest a complex market with regular
trade flow reversals and periods of unprofitable trade between key markets. It is widely accep-
ted in Belgian historiography that the construction of a paved road network caused a substan-
tial reduction in transaction costs. Our research, however, indicates that distance, fixed costs
or links by rivers and canals influenced transaction costs more than the expansion of a paved
road network. 
Résumé. Expansion du réseau routier et intégration des marchés dans les Pays-Bas
autrichiens de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle. L’article analyse l’intégration des marchés
du blé entre 18 villes des Pays-Bas autrichiens, dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle. Il s’in-
téresse en particulier au rôle qu’aurait joué la rapide expansion du réseau de routes pavées
dans cette intégration. Un treshold cointegration est utilisé pour évaluer l’intégration à court
et à long terme entre ces marchés, à partir de données mensuelles sur les prix du blé. Il appa-
raît que, tout au long de la période étudiée, les marchés étaient bien interconnectés. Mais
l’ajustement aux chocs locaux ne se faisait qu’assez lentement. En outre, les coûts de tran-
saction s’avèrent relativement élevés. Ces résultats donnent l’image d’un marché complexe,
avec des inversions régulières des flux et des périodes où le commerce entre des marchés-clés
ne dégageait pas de profits. L’historiographie belge considère en général que la construction
d’un réseau de routes pavées a réduit les coûts de transaction de façon substantielle. La pré-
sente recherche, elle, indique que ces derniers étaient surtout influencés par la distance, les
coûts fixes et l’existence de rivières et canaux, plutôt que par le réseau routier. 
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It is widely argued that improvements in transport and information
technology increased the opportunities for trade and arbitrage, and therefo-
re stimulated market integration 1. In this paper, we use the Austrian Low
Countries as a test case. During the 18th century, an impressive network of
paved roads was built in this economically advanced area, linking most
cities to each other. Many authors have suggested that this caused a sub-
stantial reduction in transaction costs 2.
The absence of transport prices impedes us to quantify directly the
beneficial effects of road construction on trade, but Blondé advances the fol-
lowing qualitative arguments to stress their importance. A first advantage is
that fewer horses could transport heavier freights over longer distances. This
generated serious cost reductions as the maintenance of horses accounted for
approximately half of total transport costs. Second, the reliability of transport
services improved substantially since it became less dependent on weather
conditions. Rainfall and light snow slowed down transport on paved roads,
but usually did not make it impossible anymore, as was often the case on dirt
roads. Consequently, overland transport could more or less continue during
winter, so that the sector’s heavy fixed costs — maintenance of horses and
carriages — could be distributed over more rides. Third, road transport beca-
me faster, despite the appearance of many tollhouses along paved roads.
Due to lack of data, it is impossible to test these arguments directly.
Therefore, we use an indirect approach. Using price data of an important
commodity traded in many cities, e.g. wheat, we ask whether the develop-
ment of paved roads contributed to the creation of a national market, i.e. a
system of spatially interlinked markets across the territory. Do we observe
a decline in transaction costs when moving wheat around the country during
the second half of the 18th century? Was there a change in the speed of arbi-
trage among wheat markets? 
In analysing the issue of market integration, we apply recent econometric
techniques from the booming literature on spatial price analysis in e.g. agricul-
tural economics. In particular, we build on recent time series techniques for the
analysis of co-movement of non-stationary series (cointegration) and the
implied dynamic adjustment processes (error-correction). However, the stan-
dard way of applying these techniques to commodity markets assumes conti-
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1. EJRNAES, M. & PERSSON, K. G., 1997; GOODWIN, B. & GRENNES, T. J., 1998;
PERSSON, K. G., 1999.
2. For a detailed discussion, see B. BLONDÉ, 1999.
nuous, unidirectional trade. This is unlikely to be realistic in a relatively small
area with several important markets, which may be supplied by a variety of
sources from different directions. As a consequence, there may be regular per-
iods of absent trade on certain routes. Depending on local conditions, trade
flows may change as well. A standard, single-equation dynamic error-correction
model cannot handle this phenomenon. To implement this analysis, we use a
switching error-correction regression approach using threshold cointegration 3.
1. Sources 
To answer the questions mentioned above, it is clear that we need
detailed and accurate price data that reflect real market conditions. Since the
late Middle Ages, many city governments in the Southern Low Countries
collected price data to monitor the local food situation. Most of these figures
have been published as annual averages. Since we want to measure the
speed at which markets responded to each other, we need at least monthly
data. Unfortunately, the number of cities for which monthly price data have
been published is fairly limited. Moreover, the way these price series were
constructed varied strongly from researcher to researcher. For some cities,
the author noted down the price observed during the first market day of the
month. In other instances, a monthly average was calculated after leaving
out the highest and lowest value registered during that month. In still other
cases, the opposite procedure was followed: the author took the average of
the highest and lowest price observed during that month. Sometimes we just
do not know what procedure was used 4. Given the volatile character of food
prices, comparing such figures can lead to highly misleading results. 
Fortunately, there is a source available that circumvents most of these
problems. Its emergence is related to a fundamental change in the economic
policy of the Austrian Low Countries’ central government. Until the mid-
18th century, the central government’s food policy was dominated by ad hoc
crisis management in the case of acute shortages 5. Influenced by mercanti-
list ideas, it was replaced in the late 1750s by a constant concern of organi-
sing efficient food supplies 6. In addition, the central government aimed at
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3. OBSTFELD, M. & TAYLOR, A. M., 1997; PRAKASH, G. & TAYLOR, A. L., 1997;
EJRNAES, M. & PERSSON, K. G., 2000.
4. From another point of view, Van der Wee was also very dissatisfied of the quality of
the series published. See H. VAN DER WEE, 1961.
5. For a general assessment in a European context, see K. G. PERSSON, 1996 and 1999.
pursuing a more differentiated grain policy. Until the mid-18th century,
export prohibitions had a general character. Thereafter, they became restric-
ted to certain grain products and to certain areas 7. All this necessitated a
close monitoring of fluctuations in local grain prices. Therefore, the central
government decided to establish its own information network. 
From 1765 to 1794, customs officials registered market prices in a
standardised way in more than twenty cities. Specialised civil servants
supervised the whole operation and compared the obtained figures with the
weekly price lists collected by the city governments. As the various city
administrations used their own local measurement systems, these speciali-
sed civil servants had to convert the price data in a common measurement
unit, e.g. in Brabantine stuivers per razier from Brussels 8. Finally, these
data were used as an input to produce detailed reports on the Austrian Low
Countries’ food situation 9 published a considerable part of these data 10. For
various agricultural products he noted down the prices observed during the
first market day of the month. Therefore, the time of price registration was
the same for all markets under consideration. 
We limit our research to wheat prices, as this commodity was by far the
most traded grain product in the Austrian Low Countries 11. Moreover, wheat
has a higher value/weight ratio than rye, so that the profits from arbitrage are
likely to be substantial. We selected eighteen markets for which close to all
360 monthly observations are available (see Table 1). A comparison with
early 19th-century turnover data tells us that the eighteen recorded cities
compose a representative sample of all large and medium-sized grain mar-
kets in the Austrian Low Countries. The only drawback is that Limburg and
Luxembourg are not represented in the sample. Agriculture in these regions
was not well developed, so that subsistence farming dominated the picture 12.
Absence of important wheat markets was the obvious result.
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6. MATERNÉ, J., 1994.
7. VANDENBROEKE, C., 1967.
8. A razier from Brussels is 49 litres.
9. MATERNÉ, J., 1994. 
10. VANDENBROEKE, C.,1973.
11. We do not know the sales volumes of grain during the second half of the 18th centu-
ry. In 1813, the sales volume of wheat on « Belgian » markets amounted to 731,000 hecto-
litres, compared to 492,000 hectolitres for rye. We have no reasons to believe that these pro-
portions were substantially different in the preceding decades. (We thank Dr. M. Goossens
for providing us these data which are based on Archives Nationales, Paris, F11 843). 
12. DEJONGH, G., 2000.
Map 1. The Austrian Low Countries and their transport infrastructure
(canals and roads) by the end of the 18th century
Note: We thank Dr. Michael-W. Serruys for kindly providing us this map. 
2. General context
Table 1 provides details on the size of these markets. Even though the
data are from 1813, it seems unlikely that the order and relative importance
had changed dramatically since the late 18th century. Leuven was undoub-
tedly the most important wheat market of the Austrian Low Countries. It
was located in the middle of rich agricultural areas that were linked to the
city by a network of canals and paved roads. Moreover, Leuven was an
important centre of beer breweries consuming large quantities of grain.
Charleroi, in second position, benefited from its location on the edges of the
rich farmlands of Hainaut and Walloon Brabant. Moreover, the strong
expansion of coal mining and iron making in the area created a large
demand for wheat. The Brussels wheat market occupied a strong third posi-
tion. Being the capital of the Austrian Low Countries, the city counted many
high-income earners, e.g. top civil servants, lawyers, and traders. 
Looking at the evolution of wheat prices between 1765 and 1794, we
notice a remarkable stability (for Brussels, see Figure 1). During most of the
period, the Austrian Low Countries produced an export surplus which
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Scale: 1/3.000.000
explains the relative absence of price hikes 13. The only real exception is
1789, as a result of crop failure and mounting political tensions. Both ele-
ments would eventually lead to the so-called Brabantine Revolution, which
gave large parts of the Austrian Low Countries a short-lived independence
(October 1789-October 1790). The turmoil clearly resulted in an increased
volatility of wheat prices. Another, but much smaller blip in wheat prices is
registered in the early 1770s, due to poor harvests. 
To introduce price differences between markets, we focus on two large
ones located close to each other, Leuven and Brussels. The latter being a
centre of high income earners, it is not surprising that wheat prices were
somewhat higher in the capital of the Austrian Low Countries than in
Leuven. Figure 2 shows that the price relationship between the two cities
was relatively stable in the long run, which suggests that arbitrage between
these well-established markets may have taken place. Stability is clearly
interrupted in the early 1790s and the series afterwards may well be too
small to check the persistence of the earlier patterns. 
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13. For the same reason, urban regulations on the wheat trade only had a nuisance value.
Markets such as Tournai and Kortrijk were situated close to important French cities, so that
it is not impossible that some French wheat was also traded there. 
Market Hectolitres
Leuven 99,436
Charleroi 87,355
Brussels 70,039
Tournai 36,675
Ghent 36,463
Bruges 30,218
Veurne 28,441
St. Niklaas 26,369
Namur 24,055
Tienen 23,655
Ieper 18,166
Mechelen 17,769
Mons 14,999
Antwerp 13,831
Lier 10,729
Kortrijk 7,555
Ath 1,888
Binche 1,500
Source: Data from the Archives Nationales, Paris, F11 843 (see footnote 11).
Table 1. Relative importance of markets: yearly turnover of wheat in 1813
Figure 1. Wheat prices in Brussels, 1765-1794 (in Brabantine stuivers
per razier from Brussels)
Figure 2. Brussels wheat prices minus Leuven wheat prices, 1769-1794
An important feature is that at times the margins between these two
markets become close to zero or even negative. This suggests that in certain
seasons, no profitable trade was possible from Leuven to Brussels or even
that trade flows, if present, would have been from Brussels to Leuven. This
is a feature that complicates the econometric analysis of market integration,
as will be discussed below. 
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Figure 3. Brussels wheat prices minus Ghent wheat prices, 1765-1794
Other markets display similar features. For example, Figure 3 gives the
price differential between Brussels and Ghent. As Ghent was located in a
typically rye producing era, wheat prices in Ghent were higher than in the
capital of the Austrian Low Countries 14. Therefore, grain was usually flo-
wing from Brussels to Ghent in this period. Margins appear to be fluctua-
ting, but from the mid-1770s they seem to stabilise. Fluctuations sometimes
result in very small or reverse margins, also suggesting the absence of pro-
fitable trade or possibly trade reversals.
As indicated before, various authors have stressed the importance of
the construction of a network of paved roads as a crucial determinant of
market integration in the Austrian Low Countries. How did this network
develop in the 18th century? Before 1704, most paved roads remained limi-
ted to small and incoherent stretches around large cities. For strategic rea-
sons, a systematic network of paved roads was built during the Spanish War
of Succession that linked Brussels with other important cities, such as
Antwerp, Ghent, Leuven and Mons. After the Peace of Utrecht (1713), the
central government lost its interest in the construction of paved roads, but
the initiative was soon taken over by regional and local authorities. 
Around the middle of the 18th century the central government’s interest
in infrastructure revived again. Moreover, this policy was put into a much
broader economic perspective: the Austrian Low Countries should take over
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14. DEJONGH, G., 2000.
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a part of Holland’s profitable transit trade to Liège and the Rhineland.
Investments in the port of Ostend and in the construction of an integrated net-
work of waterways and paved roads played a key role in this plan. By 1763,
the road network connected most of the main towns and a decade later the
east-west project was realised 15. Blondé has demonstrated that it proved to be
a highly successful strategy in attracting transit trade. Of course, domestic
trade also benefited substantially from the improved infrastructure network 16.
By the early 1790s, provincial roads had expanded too, so that the Austrian
Low Countries obtained the highest paved road density in Europe 17.
3. Data analysis method
In the analysis, we can only rely on price data and on information
about the extension of the paved road network. First, we will try to use the
price information to address two questions. (1) Can we detect evidence that
markets are integrated? (2) How fast is this adjustment occurring? Then, we
will try to link the results from the econometric analysis to the road network
evolution in the 18th century. In particular, we will investigate whether the
presence and development of paved roads can explain our estimates of tran-
saction costs and of arbitrage speed between markets. 
The fact that only price information is available limits the methodolo-
gical possibilities to analyse market integration. In line with other studies,
statistical properties of the relationship between prices in different markets
can tentatively be interpreted as evidence of actual linkages between these
markets. Under certain conditions, the existence of a long-run relationship
between prices of different markets can be tested, providing evidence of inte-
gration between these markets in the long run. Furthermore, dynamic equa-
tions can then be derived, specifying the dynamic processes leading from
short-run disequilibria to the long-run equilibrium. Applying this model to
the situation described above in 18th-century wheat markets is problematic.
The reason is the recurrence of very low or even negative margins. This sug-
gests that at times, no profitable trade was possible or trade flows were rever-
sed. Consequently, we need an approach that can handle this situation.
15. For more details, see e.g. G. THEWES, 1994; GENICOT, L., 1939 and 1946; URBAIN, Y.,
1939.
16. BLONDÉ, B., 1999.
17. GENICOT, 1946.
Formally, let Ctij be the transaction cost of moving grain between mar-
kets i and j in period t. Let Pti be the price of grain in market i and Ptjthe
price in market j. Efficient spatial arbitrage 18 requires then that there are
unexploited profits from trade between markets i and j unless transaction
costs exceed potential margins, or:
(1)
Non-zero trade flows under efficient arbitrage would imply equality of
both sides in (1). Efficient arbitrage could imply flows from i to j or from j
to i, depending on market conditions in i and j. When (1) is valid with equa-
lity, prices are said to be at the parity bound. If margins are larger than the
parity bounds, profitable trade could take place. Strict inequality of (1)
would require zero trade flows. As in Ravallion, if (1) is valid, then the two
spatially separated markets will be referred to as integrated 19. A weaker
form of market integration could be defined as requiring (1) only to be valid
in the long run: deviations could occur in the short run, but arbitrage would
in due course return the market to satisfy (1). 
There have been different approaches to develop this into a statistical
model of market integration 20. Cointegration models only use price data and
test whether there is a particular stable relationship between prices in i and
j, in the long run  Note that for these models to be consistent with the effi-
cient arbitrage model, they require continuous trade and no flow reversal.
The model tested is:
(2)
Stationarity of ht implies the existence of a long-run relationship bet-
ween prices: they move together. It is implicit in the model that trade is taking
place continuously and in one direction only. Errors are made, however, and
they are corrected over some period of time. The Engle-Granger results imply
the existence of an error-correction representation that models this correction
process over time. Testing restrictions on this error-correction model allows
inference about the speed of adjustment to this long-run relationship 21.
However, it is clearly only a limiting case of the efficient arbitrage condition
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18. TAKAYAMA, T. & JUDGE, G. G., 1971.
19. RAVALLION, M., 1986.
20. The readers who are not familiar with cointegration models (or time series in gene-
ral) should refer to the Annex below before reading this part of the paper. It presents the
method and gives intuitive definitions of technical terms and parameters. 
in (1), excluding situations in which no profitable trade can take place and
markets in which conditions change sufficiently to allow a reversal of the
trade flow. In recent years, threshold cointegration models have been develo-
ped to deal with these situations and applied to market integration 22.
Suppose that, as is usually the case, (real) prices in market i and j are
non-stationary. Suppose further that real transfer costs to move grain between
markets i and j are equal to Cij in each direction, and constant over time. To
derive an alternative model that could address some of the shortcomings of
other approaches, let us define the margin between the prices in i and j as:
(3)
Suppose that for the time being we have no information about trade
flows nor about transaction costs. We can distinguish three regimes, depen-
ding on the difference between margin and transaction costs: mt > Cij,
mt < -Cij and |mt| ≤ Cij. The last regime corresponds to (1), the condition
for efficient spatial arbitrage, and consists of both situations in which trade
occurs and arbitrage is efficient, and situations in which no profitable trade
occurs. In the first (resp. second) regime, market traders have not exploited
profitable trade opportunities, in moving grain from i to j (resp. j to i). 
If arbitrage takes place, however slowly, then mt would in the long run
be a process returning to a band [-Cij, Cij]. Arbitrage will only happen out-
side this band until the threshold values of the band are reached. Even
though mt does not return to a particular equilibrium level but to a band, mt
is a stationary process. A threshold cointegration model and in particular the
Band-Threshold Autoregression Model (Band-TAR) provides a reasonable
way to characterise the behaviour of the actual margin mt 23. A version of the
model can be specified as follows. Inside the parity bounds, when arbitrage
is efficient, there is no arbitrage and the price gap shows no central tenden-
cy. When outside the parity bounds, arbitrage takes place and, just as in
Purchasing Power Parities or error-correction models, there will be some
non-linear autoregressive process to return to the long run band, and the size
of the adjustment will be a percentage of the deviation in each period.
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21. PALASKAS, T. B. & HARRISS-WHITE, B., 1993; ALEXANDER, C. & WYETH, J., 1994;
GOODWIN, B. & SCHROEDER, T., 1987.
22. BALKE, N. & FOMBY, T. B., 1997; PRAKASH, G. & TAYLOR, A. M., 1997;
OBSTFELD, M. & TAYLOR, A. M., 1997; GOODWIN, B. & GRENNES, T. J., 1998.
23. PRAKASH, G. & TAYLOR, A. M., 1997; OBSTFELD, M. & TAYLOR, A. M., 1997;
BALKE, N. S. & FOMBY, T. B., 1997.
Formally, defining Δmt = mt - mt-1, we can write this process as:
(4)
where r is the speed of adjustment of mt towards the band [-Cij, Cij] 24. The
value of r is expected to be in the half open interval ]0, -1] 25. In equa-
tion (4), the errors are white noise, i.e. htout is i.i.d.(0, sout2) and htin is
i.i.d.(0, sin2). Inside the band [-Cij, Cij], there is no adjustment: the margin
follows a random walk. Note that in this model, even though mt is globally
stationary, locally, i.e. inside the band, it displays unit root behaviour. 
The link with error-correction models can be seen very clearly if we re-
write (4) using (3):
(5)
Inside the band (when [Pit - Pjt ≤ Cij ]), there is no systematic dynamic
relationship between changes in prices in each market. However, outside the
band, error-correction behaviours can be observed (they are described by
the part of the equation involving the r parameter). Changes in one market
are only passed on with error to the other market, but there is a process of
correction: in each period, part of the error is corrected. Like in previous
error-correction model based analysis for market integration, a natural mea-
sure of how well markets are integrated for given transfer costs and given
the existence of a long-run (band) equilibrium is the speed of adjustment r:
the closer to minus one, the better markets are integrated.
Equations (4) and (5) also show very clearly the subtle relationship
between cointegration and spatial price arbitrage. If spatial arbitrage takes
place, unit root behaviour in price margins should be observed. This regime
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24. The model could be easily generalised by allowing for further lags in m and by allo-
wing rand hout to be different depending on whether mt-1 > Cij or mt-1 < -Cij. The estima-
tion technique remains unchanged.
25. ris expected to be zero if Cij is sufficiently large not to allow ever any trade to take
place or if never any scope for profitable arbitrage can be observed. In general, if the markets
are not connected for whatever reason (market imperfections or high transfer costs), then ris
expected to be zero. 
Δ
ΔP
t = 
in
>
≤
>
includes margins up to and including the parity bound; only when imperfect
arbitrage takes place will we observe cointegration and the error-correction
formulation to be correct. The model given is a simple version of the Band-
TAR model. Balke and Fomby give extensions in terms of a more compli-
cated lag-structure, different adjustment speeds depending on the side of the
price band, different threshold structure and other market equilibria 26.
Even though the margin in this model is locally non-stationary, it is ove-
rall stationary, provided r is non-zero. Of course, stationarity needs to be tes-
ted. Balke and Fomby use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the power
of a large number of tests and find that standard tests for cointegration, such
the ADF or the Phillips-Perron tests, still have reasonably high power, even if
the true model is a TAR 27. Stationarity of the margin is evidence of intercon-
nectedness: at least in the long-run, the markets are integrated. 
Once stationarity of the margin is established, one can proceed with the
estimation of the Band-TAR model. The strategy is to estimate the model
using a grid search over different possible values for the threshold. The
basic tool is an arranged autoregression. In our application, this orders the
data according to the values of Dmt rather than by time. Note, however, that
the dynamic relationship between mt and its lags is retained; only the order
of the observations is different. The sample is then partitioned in two sub-
samples, one with all the observations inside the band and one with all the
observations outside the band. Next, one has to choose a criterion, either to
maximise the likelihood function of the TAR model 28, or to maximise the
sum of the residual sum of squared errors in each of the sub-samples 29.
Given the piecewise linearity of the model outside the band and the unit root
behaviour inside the band, either method is efficient and equivalent. These
procedures return (super-consistent) estimates of the threshold (Cij) and the
adjustment speed r 30. 
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26. BALKE, N. S. & FOMBY, T. B., 1997.
27. The superconsistency results related to estimates of the cointegrating vector can be
shown to apply as well. Even though no inference is possible on these estimates, in this stage
the assumption of constant additive (i.e. non-proportional) transfer costs as assumed in the
model could be looked into, by checking whether the coefficient on the other price in the
cointegrating relationship is close to one (PALASKAS, T. B. & HARRISS-WHITE, B., 1993;
DERCON, S., 1995).
28. As in G. PRAKASH & A. M. TAYLOR, 1997 and M. OBSTFELD & A. M. TAYLOR, 1997.
29. BALKE, N. S. & FOMBY, T. B., 1997.
30. CHAN, K. S., 1993.
The estimated threshold provides an estimate of the margin used in
trade. Its significance and confidence interval are not straighforwardly deri-
ved, since the parameter space is truncated at zero (i.e. the threshold is not
defined for non-positive values). Non-standard distributions could be deri-
ved using Monte Carlo simulations. Measures of the degree of market inte-
gration are straightforwardly derived from the analysis. The estimated value
of the adjustment speed r gives the speed with which arbitrage restores
equilibrium when profitable trade opportunities exist. The closer r to minus
one, the faster the adjustment. If the estimate is statistically not different
from minus one, integration can be said to occur in the short run. Since both
the estimated thresholds and the arbitrage speed are estimated for a large
number of market pairs, we can further use these estimates to look for the
determinants of transactions costs and arbitrage speed across markets, and
more specifically for the role of roads and distances.
4. Empirical Results
To put the empirical results in perspective, Table 2 gives an overview
of some of the key market relations, mainly neighbouring markets or links
between the larger towns 31. We include information on the development of
paved roads during the survey period as well as on whether there is a river
or canal network providing a direct link between the towns 32.
Table 2 shows average margins (in absolute values) between 3 and
10 stuivers per razier from Brussels over the period. Distances are typical-
ly relatively low, but at the beginning of the 18th century, many of these key
market-pairs were not connected by a paved road: about half were connec-
ted in 1718, while the network had expanded to about 63 percent in 1763
and 78 percent by 1793. Direct links by water are important but many towns
are not connected in this way.
To conduct the threshold cointegration analysis on the price series of
these market pairs, we first need to apply non-stationarity tests on the series.
In Annex 2, Table 1, we find that the series are non-stationary in levels, but
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31. In Annex 2 we provide further results of (potentially) more indirectly connected markets.
32. In this period, rivers and canals connected directly the following towns: Charleroi-Namur
(Samber), Brussels-Antwerp (canal), Lier-Antwerp (Nete), Leuven-Mechelen (canal), Ath-
Tournai (Dender), Tournai-Gent-Antwerp (Scheldt), Bruges-Ghent (canal), Kortrijk-Ghent
(Leie), Veurne-Bruges (canal), Ieper-Veurne (canal), Lier-Mechelen (Nete), Mechelen-
Antwerp (Rupel).
stationary in first differences, as expected. Cointegration tests were then
conducted, as a test for long-run co-movement of the price series. The result
of these tests (Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with
12 lags) are reported in Table 3. We find that the null of no cointegration is
rejected at 1 percent for all but two market pairs tested, where it is rejected
at 5 percent 32. In short, cointegration is present, so that in the long-run all
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Market Pairs: Mean Distance Road in Road in Road in River or
Margin* (km) 1718 1763 1793 canal 1783
Ath Tournai 7,1 29 No Yes Yes Yes
Ghent Tournai 9,0 71 No Yes Yes Yes
Kortrijk Tournai 6,4 26 No Yes Yes No
Binche Mons 4,5 15 No Yes Yes No
Ath Mons 5,9 19 No Yes Yes No
Brussels Mons 6,1 52 Yes Yes Yes No
Charleroi Binche 6,8 19 No No No No
Brussels Ath 5,8 43 No No Yes No
Namur Charleroi 4,0 39 No No Yes Yes
Brussels Charleroi 5,3 59 No Yes Yes No
Brussels Namur 5,3 50 No Yes Yes No
Tienen Namur 5,9 45 No No No No
Leuven Namur 4,6 47 No Yes Yes No
Mechelen Brussels 4,3 23 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ghent Brussels 9,8 51 Yes Yes Yes No
Leuven Brussels 3,6 26 Yes Yes Yes No
Leuven Tienen 6,8 20 Yes Yes Yes No
Antwerp Mechelen 4,6 24 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leuven Mechelen 5,9 24 No Yes Yes Yes
Lier Antwerp 7,0 13 Yes Yes Yes Yes
St Niklaas Antwerp 5,0 25 No No No No
Ghent Antwerp 8,9 98 No No No Yes
Bruges Antwerp 7,4 160 No No No Yes
Ghent St Niklaas 9,1 30 No No No No
Bruges Ghent 6,9 62 No No No Yes
Kortrijk Ghent 8,9 45 No Yes Yes Yes
Veurne Bruges 9,5 45 No No Yes Yes
Ieper Bruges 7,7 48 No No Yes No
Kortrijk Bruges 8,3 46 No Yes Yes No
Kortrijk Ieper 6,2 25 No Yes Yes No
* Stuiver per razier from Brussels.
Table 2. Main characteristics of key markets
32. The null states that there is unit root behaviour in the error term of the cointegrating
relationship, or equivalently, that there is no cointegration. If the null is rejected, we have
cointegration. Here, we reject the null of no cointegration for all market pairs on a 1 percent
level, except for two pairs, where we can reject « only » at 5 percent.
these markets are connected. Note that this is the case despite the absence of
roads for a number of market pairs. If we extend the analysis to other mar-
kets, which are only indirectly linked, we find the same result. Indeed, for 99
percent of all possible combinations of price differentials, we find stationary
errors in the cointegrating relationship. In Annex 2, Table 2, we give some of
the results. An alternative test involves looking at the stationarity of the dif-
ference between prices in different markets. Implicitly, this is imposing the
restriction on the cointegrating vector that the coefficient on the price at the
right hand side is equal to one. Annex 3, Table 3 gives the results for the key
markets. Virtually all margins are stationary at least at 10 percent. 
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DF ADF(12)
Ath Tournai -7,69 ** -3,17 **
Ghent Tournai -9,15 ** -3,65 **
Kortrijk Tournai -9,97 ** -4,57 **
Binche Mons -9,70 ** -2,82 **
Ath Mons -7,76 ** -2,36 *
Brussels Mons -8,70 ** -4,37 **
Charleroi Binche -11,45 ** -3,80 **
Brussels Ath -8,07 ** -4,64 **
Namur Charleroi -11,65 ** -3,81 **
Brussels Charleroi -11,75 ** -5,74 **
Brussels Namur -10,56 ** -4,73 **
Tienen Namur -8,76 ** -4,29 **
Leuven Namur -10,85 ** -3,73 **
Mechelen Brussels -9,30 ** -4,80 **
Ghent Brussels -7,12 ** -3,54 **
Leuven Brussels -11,40 ** -4,22 **
Leuven Tienen -10,43 ** -4,30 **
Antwerp Mechelen -7,63 ** -4,21 **
Leuven Mechelen -9,80 ** -4,31 **
Lier Antwerp -6,67 ** -3,43 **
St Niklaas Antwerp -7,27 ** -3,83 **
Ghent Antwerp -9,04 ** -3,55 **
Bruges Antwerp -6,12 ** -2,59 *
Ghent St Niklaas -7,88 ** -3,63 **
Bruges Ghent -7,02 ** -2,62 **
Kortrijk Ghent -7,95 ** -4,19 **
Veurne Bruges -8,07 ** -3,61 **
Ieper Bruges -5,56 ** -3,59 **
Kortrijk Bruges -6,47 ** -2,94 **
Kortrijk Ieper -7,60 ** -3,64 **
Note: 1 percent critical value is -2.60 (**), 5 percent critical value is -1.95.
Table 3. Cointegration tests as tests for long-run market integration
The fact that the significance of the test-statistic is typically lower than
the one obtained using an unrestricted cointegrating vector may suggest that
in some cases, the coefficient on prices is not equal to one. Inference on the
cointegrating vector is not possible, but in most cases we find the coefficient
on the market price on the right hand side to be relatively close to one, jus-
tifying the specification of a dynamic model in margins as in (5). Given the
possibility of regular trade reversals, we present a threshold cointegration
model, using the margins as the cointegrating relationship in Table 4. We
give the estimated threshold, which is our best estimate of transaction costs,
and the coefficient on the error-correction term (lagged margin in (5)),
which gives an indicator of the adjustment speed to long-run equilibrium.
Recall that a fast and immediate correction would require a coefficient of
minus one, i.e. all errors are immediately corrected and ‘short-run integra-
tion’ is present. We include therefore a test on the null hypothesis of short-
run integration. For comparison, we also give the results of a simple error-
correction model (in particular an AR(1) model on the margins), which
would be the true model if thresholds did not matter, i.e. if we did not worry
about trade reversal and the absence of trade in some periods.
Inference on the thresholds is complicated since non-positive values are
not defined, so that test-statistics follow non-standard distributions.
However, we can immediately test the null of short-run integration. It
appears that despite typically higher adjustment speeds than if we misspeci-
fied the model to exclude periods of non-profitable trade or trade reversal,
only in two market pairs do we find that the null of short-run integration can-
not be rejected (Ath-Tournai and Brussels-Charleroi). In short, even though
the data are only monthly, they do not support a hypothesis of fast and imme-
diate corrections (within one month) to deviations from the long-run equili-
brium. In other words, adjustment is sluggish. Considering other market
pairs, which are only indirectly linked, confirms these estimates (Annex 2,
Table 3). Virtually no markets can be found with immediate adjustment of
deviations from the long-run margins, i.e. short-run integration is not present.
Table 5 illustrates this further. For these key markets, we give the half-
life implied by the estimates, i.e. the time that is needed for a variable to
return to half its initial value — a measure of how fast errors are corrected 34.
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34. A half-life is the solution for T in x(t+T)=x(t)/2. It can be shown that
T = ln(1/2) /ln(b), with b = 1 + Dx(t) / x(t-1), or in our case, b = 1 + r. If ris -0.5, then T is
one, so it takes one month to correct half the shock. In the limit, when rapproaches -1, any
error in t-1 is fully corrected in t. 
Typically, half-lives are relatively substantial. On average about 1.4 months
(i.e. about 42 days) are needed to correct half the error, although the range
is up to 4 months, according to our point estimates. 
Table 4. Dynamic adjustment model and short run integration
**= significant at 1 percent. *=significant at 5 percent
The analysis also generated information on trade opportunities that are
left unexploited to some extent in each period. In particular, we have esti-
mated how often a market pair is located in one of the three regimes speci-
fied in equation (5): (a) no trade possible due to margins below transactions
costs, (b) potential trade from the first market to the other, since the current
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Threshold cointegration model (5) AR(1) (simple error-correction)
model
Estimated Adjustment t value Short run Adjustment t value Short run
Threshold speed adjustm. integrat. speed adjustm. integrat.
Ath Tournai 10,70 -1,01 -8,30** -0,08 -0,29 -7,82** 19,23**
Ghent Tournai 4,00 -0,42 -7,93** 10,95** -0,29 -7,79** 19,09**
Kortrijk Tournai 1,40 -0,51 -10,18** 9,78** -0,45 -10,19** 12,43**
Binche Mons 1,20 -0,46 -9,00** 10,57** -0,40 -9,41** 14,31**
Ath Mons 3,20 -0,37 -7,24** 12,33** -0,25 -7,21** 21,22**
Brussels Mons 8,50 -0,51 -5,67** 5,4** -0,20 -6,23** 24,41**
Charleroi Binche 5,30 -0,60 -9,31** 6,21** -0,29 -7,79** 19,01** 
Brussels Ath 2,60 -0,34 -7,01** 13,61** -0,25 -7,08** 21,79**
Namur Charleroi 0,51 -0,57 -11,05** 8,34** -0,53 -11,39** 9,95**
Brussels Charleroi 5,90 -1,05 -12,43** -0,59 -0,40 -9,51** 14,53**
Brussels Namur 5,10 -0,67 -7,87** 3,88** -0,28 -7,82** 19,86**
Tienen Namur 2,00 -0,23 -5,90** 19,75** -0,19 -6,10** 26,41**
Leuven Namur 3,60 -0,76 -9,43** 2,98** -0,46 -9,62** 11,28**
Mechelen Brussels 0,50 -0,37 -8,51** 14,49** -0,34 -8,63** 16,53**
Ghent Brussels 13,00 -0,37 -4,81** 8,19** -0,09 -4,21** 40,61**
Leuven Brussels 2,91 -0,83 -10,29** 2,11* -0,52 -10,44** 9,49**
Leuven Tienen 7,19 -0,59 -7,01** 4,87** -0,23 -6,26** 21,28**
Antwerp Mechelen 1,00 -0,31 -7,22** 16,07** -0,28 -7,55** 19,79** 
Leuven Mechelen 3,50 -0,54 -7,65** 6,52** -0,33 -7,80** 15,90**
Lier Antwerp 4,53 -0,29 -5,74** 14,05** -0,16 -5,53** 29,40**
St Niklaas Antwerp 1,00 -0,30 -6,94** 16,19** -0,27 -7,41** 20,39**
Ghent Antwerp 7,72 -0,38 -6,52** 10,64** -0,16 -5,56** 30,00**
Bruges Antwerp 1,00 -0,15 -4,90** 27,77** -0,14 -5,17** 31,88**
Ghent St Niklaas 5,60 -0,24 -5,37** 17,01** -0,15 -5,43** 30,27**
Bruges Ghent 8,00 -0,57 -7,06** 5,33** -0,23 -6,84** 22,92**
Kortrijk Ghent 4,60 -0,27 -6,25** 16,90** -0,18 -6,03** 26,72**
Veurne Bruges 7,91 -0,34 -6,14** 11,92** -0,15 -5,21** 30,57**
Ieper Bruges 2,30 -0,18 -5,24** 23,87** -0,14 -5,24** 31,10**
Kortrijk Bruges 9,10 -0,48 -7,85** 8,50** -0,19 -6,11** 26,27**
Kortrijk Ieper 1,00 -0,32 -7,86** 16,70** -0,29 -7,85** 18,81**
price margins appear to be exceeding current transactions costs, and (c) the
reverse situation expressing unexploited profits via a trade reversal, since
profitable trade could take place from the second to the first market (mar-
gins larger than transactions costs). 
Table 5. Half-life implied by the estimated adjustment speed
(half-lives in months)
Table 6 reports the estimated situation in the wheat markets of the
Austrian Low Countries in this period. First note that many markets incentives
appear to have existed for trade flow reversals, i.e. potential trade has occur-
red in both directions at different times in this period. For very few markets
the direction of trade remained unchanged most of the time. This is evidence
of a complex and probably quite active grain market in this area, despite the
fact that immediate adjustment to long-run margins does not take place. In
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Half-life
Ath Tournai 0,00
Ghent Tournai 1,27
Kortrijk Tournai 0,97
Binche Mons 1,12
Ath Mons 1,50
Brussels Mons 0,97
Charleroi Binche 0,76
Brussels Ath 1,67
Namur Charleroi 0,82
Brussels Charleroi 0,00
Brussels Namur 0,63
Tienen Namur 2,65
Leuven Namur 0,49
Mechelen Brussels 1,50
Ghent Brussels 1,50
Leuven Brussels 0,39
Leuven Tienen 0,78
Antwerp Mechelen 1,87
Leuven Mechelen 0,89
Lier Antwerp 2,02
St Niklaas Antwerp 1,94
Ghent Antwerp 1,45
Bruges Antwerp 4,27
Ghent St Niklaas 2,53
Bruges Ghent 0,82
Kortrijk Ghent 2,20
Veurne Bruges 1,67
Ieper Bruges 3,49
Kortrijk Bruges 1,06
Kortrijk Ieper 1,80
addition, transactions costs appear at times too high for trade between the mar-
kets, presumably because supplies from other areas make the trade relation-
ship not profitable; for some markets, this is quite regularly the case.
Unfortunately, one would need trade flow data, which are currently unavai-
lable, to be able to confirm this interpretation. Nevertheless, in the Austrian
Low Countries, there is a long history of fairly intense grain trade between dif-
ferent towns at least since medieval times, with small or larger quantities being
moved around 35. At the same time, wheat is a bulky, relatively low value com-
modity. Therefore, transactions costs in moving grain are relatively high in
relation to its value, so that large margins will be needed to induce trade.
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Market (1) Market (2) Potential Inside the Potential trade 
trade from transactions from (2) to (1)
(1) to (2) cost band ‘no trade’
Ath Tournai 14 73 13
Ghent Tournai 15 28 57
Kortrijk Tournai 46 16 38
Binche Mons 43 22 35
Ath Mons 35 36 30
Brussels Mons 24 75 2
Charleroi Binche 52 44 4
Brussels Ath 52 27 20
Namur Charleroi 51 12 37
Brussels Charleroi 8 57 35
Brussels Namur 3 58 39
Tienen Namur 67 26 6
Leuven Namur 11 47 41
Mechelen Brussels 34 11 55
Gent Brussels 0 69 31
Leuven Brussels 39 45 15
Leuven Tienen 1 63 36
Antwerp Mechelen 49 18 34
Leuven Mechelen 53 31 16
Lier Antwerp 14 32 54
St Niklaas Antwerp 41 22 37
Ghent Antwerp 1 45 54
Bruges Antwerp 22 14 64
Ghent St Niklaas 2 40 59
Bruges Ghent 31 59 9
Kortrijk Ghent 60 30 10
Veurne Bruges 55 43 2
Ieper Bruges 59 18 23
Kortrijk Bruges 30 63 7
Kortrijk Ieper 51 13 36
Note: Figures are percentages of observations in the regime.
Table 6. Direction of trade opportunities implied by regressions
To conclude, we find evidence of an integrated market, at least in the
long run. Arbitrage to bring margins in line with long-run levels is relatively
slow, which is in line with the findings for France 36. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence suggests a complex market with periods of changing trade flows of
wheat, resulting in some trading routes losing profitability from time to time.
We now turn to the final part of the analysis: to what extent has the pre-
sence and development of a road network contributed to this degree of mar-
ket integration? Can our fairly complicated modelling strategy provide any
insight on this issue? To study this question, we took the estimated thresholds
and the estimated adjustment speeds of all markets. We then regressed them
onto the actual distances via the existing road network, the squared distances
(to allow for non-linear changes in costs and adjustment speed), a dummy
describing whether a paved road existed in the beginning of the period under
consideration and a dummy to control for the fact that some towns have links
by water, yielding cost or other advantages in trade. Recall that the threshold
is our best approximation for transaction costs in wheat markets. The adjust-
ment speed measures the speed with which the margins return to long-run
equilibrium, presumably due to arbitrage in the market, when the margins
become larger than transaction costs. To show the added-value of the swit-
ching regression model, which allows for no trade or trade reversals, we also
did these regressions on the simple (absolute value of the) margin and the
adjustment speed implied by a simple error-correction model. Since we
expect the latter to be misspecified — an expectation based on, among others,
a visual inspection of the data series —, we can check whether this misspeci-
fication would have caused an erroneous interpretation of the evidence. We
conducted the regression on the ‘key markets’ identified before and on the
entire possible data set. Since in our relatively small area virtually all markets
seem cointegrated, this would seem methodologically acceptable. 
Tables 7 and 8 first give the evidence on respectively the margins and the
adjustment speed r from the basic error-correction model. In other words,
these regressions give the results based on probably inappropriately taking
into account the role of trade flow reversals and unprofitable trade. We find
that margins are significantly affected by distances, especially for long-dis-
tance trade. This is unsurprising since variable transaction costs presumably
increase with distance. We cannot detect any effect of the presence of paved
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35. VAN DER WEE, H., 1963.
36. O’GRADA, C. & CHEVET, J.-M., 2002.
roads or links by rivers or canals. About the adjustment speed in Table 8, we
notice that for larger distances, adjustment speed is affected by distance, albeit
in a non-linear way (a decreasing marginal effect for larger distances).
However, using transaction costs and adjustment speed estimates from our
threshold cointegration model, we find some different results. In Table 9, we
notice that estimated transaction costs increase with distance in a non-linear
way, even for the small sample of key markets. Again, the presence of roads
does not affect transaction costs. The effect of links by water is also insi-
gnificant, although in some, more restricted formulations, its effect is, as
expected, negative 37. However, in terms of adjustment speed, Table 10
shows that roads do matter and distances are non-significant. Rivers and
canals have no effect on the adjustment speed 38. Roads increase the speed
of adjustment to long-run equilibrium, suggesting faster spatial market arbi-
trage. The contribution seems especially large on relatively short distance
trade (key markets). In short, our evidence suggests that paved roads in the
18th century did not change the long-run marketing margins between mar-
kets, i.e. they do not appear to cut costs significantly. However, they encou-
raged faster market arbitrage: they cut the length of time needed to erode
any short-run deviations from the long-run margins via spatial trade. 
Table 7. Margins in the basic error-correction model
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36. For the full sample, the effect is negative and significant at 20 percent. If we drop the
(insignificant) road variable and the squared distance variable, the effect of rivers and canals
becomes significant at 10 percent. Since transport by inland water ways is especially useful
for bulky commodities, this effect is in line with expectations. If we drop the link-by-water
variable, the road variable remains insignificant. In short, some (cost-reducing) effect of the
presence of canals and rivers can be detected, but no effect from paved roads, independent of
the exact specification.
37. The effect of rivers and canals remains insignificant in all possible formulations
attempted. Dropping insignificant variables does not change the size and significance of the
coefficient of the roads variable. This is not a surprise: transport by rivers and canals is typi-
cally slow.
Key markets All market pairs
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Constant 4.691 3.919 ** 4.295 5.703 **
Road in 1765? -0.292 -0.427 0.179 0.497
Distance in km 0.062 1.784 + 0.071 4.968 **
Distance*distance -0.000 -1.374 -0.000 -3.734 **
River or canal link? 0.467 0.707 -0.393 -0.761
Joint F 1.53 12.38**
N 29 152
Table 8. Adjustment speed in basic error-correction model
Table 9. Estimated thresholds
Table 10. Adjustment speed in threshold cointegration model
5. Sensitivity Analysis
To convince ourselves about the robustness of our results, we performed
a further series of regressions. First, from a visual inspection of Figures 1, 2
and 3 and the other underlying data series, it is clear that at the end of the
period considered, the data become unstable. Indeed, it was a period of
substantial political and social instability, with the Brabantine Revolution
(1789-1790) against the Austrian authorities, followed by the consequences
of the French Revolution spilling over into the Austrian Low Countries from
207
Erik Buyst, Stefan Dercon & Bjorn Van Campenhout
Key markets All market pairs
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Constant -0.296 -3.382 ** -0.344 -12.334 **
Road in 1765? -0.047 -1.008 -0.025 -1.751 +
Distance in km 0.001 0.561 0.003 5.102 **
Distance*distance -0.000 -0.117 -0.000 -3.854 **
River or canal link -0.009 -0.021 -0.072 -1.476
Joint F 1.026 13.564**
N 29 152
Key markets All market pairs
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Constant -0.233 -1.532 -0.529 -5.388 **
Road in 1765? -0.176 -2.036 * -0.080 -1.711 +
Distance in km -0.005 -1.225 0.002 1.219
Distance*distance 0.000 1.340 -0.000 -0.612
River or canal link? 0.027 0.318 0.070 1.037
Joint F 1.73 2.94*
N 29 152
Key markets All market pairs
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Constant -0.919 -0.414 2.345 1.191
Road in 1765? 1.279 1.009 1.065 1.134
Distance in km 0.166 2.607 * 0.068 1.825 +
Distance*distance -0.000 -2.458 * -0.000 -1.430
River or canal link? 0.008 0.065 -1.907 -1.412
Joint F 1.81 2.51*
N 29 152
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1792. This instability in the relationships between markets has been docu-
mented in earlier analysis 38. While the post-1788 period is too short to per-
form a full comparable analysis, we repeated the entire econometric analysis
excluding the data until 1788. In this period, we continue to find systematic
long-run integration (via cointegration tests) for all market pairs, while the
lack of systematic fast or short-run integration remains the other main finding.
Inspecting the thresholds, we find a few changes upwards or downwards, but
they generally remain the same. Repeating the regressions in Tables 7 to 10
does not change our conclusions either. Coefficients remain very similar and
one of the core findings the fact, that road building does not appear to have
changed the transactions costs, as measured via the threshold, is still valid. 
Secondly, our results appear robust to outliers in the left-hand side
variables in Tables 9 and 10. Since the core results from these tables are
determinants of estimated variables, it is possible that poor predictions result
in large outliers. To control for this, very small and very large values were
dropped to retain only about 80 percent of the observations. No change in
the significance of the results or their interpretation could be detected.
Thirdly, we tried a few other specifications, including one with interaction
terms between roads and distance, but F-tests on restrictions suggested that
the formulation in Tables 9 and 10 could not be rejected (F (2,146) = 1.83
for the thresholds and F (2,146) = 1.37 for the adjustment speed). 
7. Interpretation
How can we interpret these findings? In particular, why did transaction
costs not decrease as a result of paved road construction? Several points can
be raised. High margins can be caused by many different factors. They
could be a reflection of market power of traders. Indeed, if market power is
sufficiently large, so that entry is practically impossible, new infrastructure
will not necessarily have a large impact on the profits made by traders. This
is not a very plausible explanation for this period. There is no evidence that
a few large traders and their families dominated 18th-century grain trade in
the Austrian Low Countries. Instead, most records suggest a relatively large
number of medium-sized enterprises. Consequently, it is unlikely that this
large number of traders could effectively control markets without any risk
of being undercut by competitors 39. 
38. BUYST, E., DERCON, S. & VAN CAMPENHOUT, B., 1998.
A more plausible explanation for the sticky nature of transaction costs
is the price structure of the tolls levied on paved roads. As the tolls varied
according to the number of harnessed horses, bulk transport was discoura-
ged. Consequently, the use of paved roads remained an expensive affair for
wheat traders. Farmers were in very much the same position. In some ins-
tances, they even refused to use paved roads and returned to the old dirt
roads. In those cases, the advantage of faster and cheaper transport was appa-
rently more than offset by the cost of the tolls. Therefore, the toll issue remai-
ned a matter of heated debate during the whole period under consideration 40. 
Discouraging bulk transport by levying toll on paved roads according
to the number of harnessed horses had at least two important economic
effects. First, it contributed to the continuing high level of fixed costs rela-
tive to variable costs in transport 41. Second, it favoured trade in high-value
commodities, more specifically the move of luxury goods from the ports at
the coast towards East into Liège and the Rhineland. The intention was to
try to capture some of the high profits Dutch traders were making by this
trade 42. Incentives were therefore created to invest in transport and trade of
high-value commodities. Consequently, traders were not likely to invest at
first in trade and transport of bulky commodities such as wheat.
Furthermore, there was little scope for back-loading as well: on the way
back from the East, traders would move other high value goods back, such
as wine, rather than cereals. Consequently, we do not have any evidence of
a large corresponding increase in new private transport capacity for inter-
city cereal trade to capitalise on the better road infrastructure that could
have resulted in cost or margin cutting. 
The finding that adjustment speeds nevertheless increased is also inter-
esting. While moving grain may not have become cheaper and long-run mar-
gins remained unaffected by roads, we observe that the adjustment speed of
prices increased significantly. In other words, the main consequence of the
road network expansion in the 18th century was a faster integration of markets:
information flew faster and the threat that wheat could be shipped increased. 
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39. VAN HOUTTE, H., 1920.
40. See B. BLONDÉ & R. VAN UYTYEN, 1999.
41. The non-linear relationship in costs means that for relatively large distances, costs are
coming down (Table 9). However, the coefficient on the quadratic term is relatively small, so
that the reduction is limited.
42. DE VRIES, J. & VAN DER WOUDE, A., 1997.
*We analysed the integration of wheat markets across 18 towns in the
Austrian Low Countries in the second half of the 18th-century and its rela-
tionship with the expansion of the paved road network in this period. During
this century, the paved road network expanded fast, resulting in paved road
connections between most towns by 1800. An inspection of data on wheat
prices suggests fairly complicated trading patterns, with periods of either no
trade or trade reversals. Consequently, we use a switching regression
approach (threshold cointegration) to study long-run and short-run integra-
tion of these markets. We find that throughout this period, markets were spa-
tially interconnected, presumably through arbitrage. However, adjusting
price margins after local shocks to long-term levels was relatively slow and
took about 42 days on average. We also find relatively high thresholds, sug-
gesting relatively high transaction costs. The implication is also that in
many periods, no trade took place between certain towns, while trade flows
were likely to have switched regularly in response to local conditions. 
It is widely accepted in Belgian historiography that the construction of
a paved road network caused a substantial reduction in transaction costs.
Our research, however, indicates that transaction costs were mainly influen-
ced by distance and fixed costs, not by the expansion of a paved road net-
work. However, adjustment speeds in markets were affected by the existen-
ce of paved roads. The evidence is consistent with a fairly complex but inte-
grated grain market. The price structure of tolls levied on paved roads dis-
couraged bulk transport. Therefore, the expansion of a paved road network
mainly favoured high-value trade, attempting to capture rents from trade
with the Rhineland in neighbouring countries. New private investment in
inter-city grain trade that may have led to the cutting of price margins and
trading costs typically appears not to have happened in this period.
Nevertheless, better communication and transport facilities due to the road
network resulted in faster arbitrage.
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Annex 1
Principle, Aim and Limits of the Cointegration Approach
Two markets are said to be integrated if they are connected through a process
of arbitrage. If markets are integrated, this will manifest itself in the price move-
ments of a single homogenous good in the two markets. Price movements in one
market will be transmitted to the other market, hence studies that try to assess mar-
ket integration rely heavily on the correlation or co-movement of prices.
The first attempts to assess the degree of market integration relied on simple
bivariate correlation coefficients between price levels in the two markets 43 or between
changes in the price levels in the two markets 44. However, this approach was limited
in terms of modeling the dynamics underlying arbitrage. The first study to explicitly
acknowledge that trade between two markets takes time, and hence prices can react
with a lag, was written by Ravallion 45. He proposed an Autoregressive Distributed
Lag model that can distinguish unrelated markets from short-run integrated markets
and long-run integrated markets. He also showed that, when there is evidence of long-
run market integration, the model belongs to the class of error-correction models.
The main issue with the Ravallion approach is the time series properties of the
price data. Generally, price series are non-stationary in nature, meaning that the
mean and variance are not constant over time. Loosely speaking, prices tend to wan-
der about with no tendency to revert to a fixed mean. Granger and Newbold showed
that regressions involving the levels of such data produce misleading results 46.
However, there is not only bad news. If there exists a linear combination of two non-
stationary time series that results in a stationary residual, the two price series are
said to be cointegrated. This means that the two series are, as it were, drifting toge-
ther at roughly the same rate. In this case, it is possible to distinguish between the
long-run equilibrium (i.e. the manner in which the two variables co-move over
time), and the short-run dynamics (i.e. the deviations of the two variables from their
long-run trend). The first can be done by looking at the cointegrating vector, while
the latter can be studied using the error-correction representation 47.
More specifically, let Pit denote the price of a homegenous good at time t in
market i. If a researcher wants to use cointegration analysis to assess the degree of
market integration between two markets (say markets 1 and 2), he will start by tes-
ting the stationarity of the price series. This involves a standard unit root test for the
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47. ENGLE, R. F. & GRANGER, C. W. J., 1987.
price series of each market, for instance the following test, proposed by Dickey and
Fuller 48:
where DPit = P
i
t - P
i
t-1 is the change in the price of the good over time, et are mean
zero white noise innovations and g is the parameter to be tested. The null of this test
is that g equals zero (in which case the process is non-stationary) against the alter-
native that it is less than zero (in which case the series is stationary). Hence, the
standard t-ratio would provide the test statistic. The time series properties, however,
render the standard critical values of the t-test invalid, so that inference has to be
based on the Dickey-Fuller critical values that were obtained using Monte Carlo
simulations. These critical values can be found in most econometrics handbooks.
If the series appears to be non stationary, it has to be first differenced, and the
test has to be carried out again. If it is stationary after first differencing, it is said to
be integrated of order one, denoted as I(1). Most economic time series are integra-
ted of order 1.
Next, one has to test for cointegration between the two series. This can be done
by running a
s t a n d a r d
Ordinary Least
Squares regression of the form:
and saving the
residuals. Next, a third unit root test has to be performed, this time on the saved resi-
duals. Hence:
where ut is again a zero mean residual and d is tested to be significantly smaller than
zero using the Dickey-Fuller critical values. If this turns out to be the case, then the
prices are said to be cointegrated. The constant a in the cointegrating regression can
then be interpreted as the constant margin between the two markets (roughly spea-
king, the tran-
saction cost),
while the b can be interpreted as a proportional transaction cost 49. Given that a long-
run relationship between the prices in the two markets has been established, the
short-run dynamics can be investigated by re-estimating the process as an error-cor-
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rection specification following the Granger representation theorem. In its simplest
form, an error-correction representation would look like this:
where w t is a again an error term and F and lare parameters to be estimated by an
Ordinary Least Squares regression. This process describes how the prices in the two
markets behave in the short run, consistent with a long-run cointegrating relationship.
Indeed, if the prices in both markets can both wander about, but they tend to wander
together in the long run, there must be some force that keeps them form wandering
apart indefinitely. This is exactly what the l in the error correction specification does.
Hence, this parameter will be estimated negative: if there is a deviation from the
cointegrating relationship, this will have to be corrected sooner or later. Therefore, it
is an indicator of the speed at which the prices adjust back to their long-run equili-
brium after a prior disequilibrium. A more intuitive way to interpret this parameter is
to express it in terms of half-lives, which gives the time that is needed for an initial
shock to the long-run equilibrium to return to half of its initial value. For instance, if
the parameter is estimated to be -1, this means that any error is completely corrected
within one time period, and hence the half-life will be zero. Generally, the lower the
absolute value of l, the more sluggish the price adjustment will be. 
The major problem with cointegration analysis in the context of market inte-
gration studies is that it does not adequately model the non-linearities that are cau-
sed by the existence of transaction costs 50. In theory, if the price difference between
two markets falls short of the transaction cost of moving the goods between the two,
a rational trader will stop trading, and the prices in each market will be determined
by local demand and local supply. In other words, within the band created by the
transaction cost, one expects no adjustment. Obviously, this will influence the time
series properties of the price series: the existence of this band will lead to a higher
probability of rejecting cointegration. 
As we saw above, cointegration methods estimate a long run relationship bet-
ween two markets with a constant transaction cost, and deviations from this rela-
tionship, be they positive or negative, are corrected at the same speed l. Hence, coin-
tegration methods are only valid in a specific market setup where one market is
indisputably a net exporter and the other is a net importer. These two markets are
connected by a continuous trade flow, and reversal of trade flows is not allowed. In
this setting, a positive deviation from the long-run relationship can be seen as too
little arbitrage, while a negative deviation from the long-run relationship is inter-
preted as too much arbitrage. These ‘errors’ will be corrected in subsequent periods,
when traders adjust their behavior by shipping more or less goods. However, even
in this case it is likely that adjustment will be asymmetric, in that negative errors
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will be corrected at a different speed than positive errors. 
If we acknowledge that transaction costs result in a band where no arbitrage
takes place, the cointegration approach becomes less attractive. In situations where
markets are not logically linked by a continuous flow of goods in one direction and
where a reversal of trade flows is possible, one has to search for alternative methods
that incorporate the non-linear adjustment process. For goods that are both a major
cash crop and a main staple food with a high volume of trade, reversal of trade flows
should not simply be ruled out. Situations where the price in the importing market
occasionally drops below the price in the exporting market (as is frequently the case
in our sample) can be seen as an indication of the possibility of trade flow reversals. 
The approach used in the main part of the paper accommodates these issues.
It allows for a range of differences between market prices in which there is no trade,
and hence no price adjustment. Furthermore, it also allows for trade flow reversals,
thereby providing a significant improvement on standard cointegration and error-
correction methods used to model price dynamics. However, the approach in this
paper has its limitations, too. It has been criticized on the grounds that it assumes
constant transaction costs. In a world where most economic series (like our price
series) are found to be non-stationary, this may indeed seem like a very strong
assumption. Furthermore, the way in which the thresholds are estimated does not
provide us with standard errors for the estimates and hence it is impossible to say
something about how precisely the transaction costs are estimated. A last reserva-
tion is that this method restricts itself to the analysis of the link between two mar-
kets at a time. However, markets typically form part of a wider market system,
where arbitrage from one market to another market often proceeds via several other
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Levels First differences
DF ADF(12) DF ADF(12)
Tournai -0,66 -0,09 -22,75 -5,98
Mons -0,21 0,14 -9,39 -2,98
Binche -0,27 0,21 -9,00 -3,06
Ath -0,29 0,24 -9,25 -3,08
Charleroi -0,41 0,07 -8,14 -2,34
Namur -0,32 0 -6,70 -2,22
Brussels -0,32 -0,01 -8,24 -3,08
Tienen -0,5 0,12 -5,10 -1,76
Mechelen -0,49 -0,01 -9,29 -3,50
Antwerp -0,25 -0,1 -9,44 -3,40
Lier -0,46 0,17 -7,96 -3,50
St Niklaas -0,51 -0,31 -7,80 -3,04
Ghent -0,51 -0,31 -7,82 -2,81
Bruges -0,38 -0,13 -8,51 -2,82
Veurne -0,69 -0,38 -8,28 -2,42
Ieper -0,54 -0,38 -9,98 -2,26
Kortrijk -0,54 -0,27 -10,93 -4,13
Leuven -0,41 0,19 -25,33 -5,10
markets. Hence, a more multivariate approach would be interesting, but the empiri-
c a l
dif-
ficulties relad to thisaproach are stillnoreolvd. 
Annex 2
Table 1 Results of stationarity tests
H0 of unit root 5% critical value is –1.95 51. Results imply that all markets are non
stationary in levels, but stationary in differences (except for Tienen).
Table 2. Cointegration tests in indirectly linked markets
Note: 1% critical value is –2.60 (**) 5% critical value is –1.95 (*)
10% critical value is –1.61 (+)
Results imply that all market pairs reported are integrated in the long run.
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DF ADF(12)
Mons Tournai -8,89 ** -3,24 **
Brussels Tournai -8,86 ** -3,74 **
Ieper Tournai -8,41 ** -3,79 **
Charleroi Mons -10,10 ** -4,02 **
Namur Mons -8,33 ** -3,90 **
Mechelen Mons -8,30 ** -3,76 **
Antwerp Mons -7,81 ** -3,75 **
Ghent Mons -6,66 ** -3,41 **
Ath Binche -9,06 ** -3,00 **
Namur Binche -8,50 ** -4,21 **
Brussels Binche -9,08 ** -4,12 **
Charleroi Ath -9,17 ** -3,55 **
Namur Ath -8,29 ** -3,87 **
Kortrijk Ath -5,89 ** -3,18 **
Leuven Charleroi -13,94 ** -4,05 **
Tienen Brussels -9,09 ** -3,75 **
Antwerpen Brussels -8,41 ** -4,57 **
Bruges Brussels -5,97 ** -3,37 **
Mechelen Tienen -8,42 ** -3,74 **
Lier Mechelen -9,61 ** -3,78 **
Leuven Antwerp -9,80 ** -3,78 **
Leuven Lier -6,73 ** -3,66 **
Bruges St Niklaas -7,02 ** -4,07 **
Veurne Ghent -6,97 ** -4,46 **
Leuven Ghent -7,08 ** -2,78 **
Ieper Veurne -9,55 ** -4,58 **
Kortrijk Veurne -8,35 ** -4,07 **
51. FULLER, W. A., 1976.
Table 3. Stationarity of margins of key market pairs
Note: 1% critical value is –2.58 (**) 5% critical value is –1.95 (*)
10% critical value is –1.62 (+)
Virtually all the key market pairs seem to have stationary margins — another way of looking
at long-run integration (i.e. imposing a coefficient of one on the price in the cointegrating vec-
tor) — at least at 10 percent. A model defined in margins appears plausible. 
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Market pairs DF sig ADF(12) sig
Ath Tournai -7.82 ** -2.92 **
Ghent Tournai -7.79 ** -3.09 **
Kortrijk Tournai -10.19 ** -4.49 **
Binche Mons -9.41 ** -2.37 *
Ath Mons -7.21 ** -2.17 *
Brussels Mons -6.23 ** -1.72 +
Charleroi Binche -7.79 ** -1.65 +
Brussels Ath -7.08 ** -2.89 **
Namur Charleroi -11.39 ** -2.34 *
Brussels Charleroi -9.51 ** -3.18 **
Brussels Namur -7.82 ** -2.68 **
Tienen Namur -6.10 ** -2.34 *
Leuven Namur -9.65 ** -2.94 **
Mechelen Brussels -8.63 ** -4.34 **
Gent Brussels -4.21 ** -2.25 *
Leuven Brussels -10.56 ** -3.39 **
Leuven Tienen -6.22 ** -1.65 +
Antwerp Mechelen -7.55 ** -3.99 **
Leuven Mechelen -7.84 ** -3.15 **
Lier Antwerp -5.53 ** -2.42 *
St Niklaas Antwerp -7.41 ** -3.23 **
Gent Antwerp -5.56 ** -1.94 +
Bruges Antwerp -5.17 ** -1.91 +
Ghent St Niklaas -5.43 ** -1.6
Bruges Ghent -6.84 ** -2.37 *
Kortrijk Ghent -6.03 ** -3.01 **
Veurne Bruges -5.21 ** -1.68 +
Ieper Bruges -5.23 ** -2.85 **
Kortrijk Bruges -6.11 ** -2.47 *
Kortrijk Ieper -7.85 ** -2.96 **
Table 4. Results of threshold models and tests for short-run integration
Results indicate that only four market pairs appear integrated in the short run.
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Threshold Rho out t rho out Short run sig AR1 tAR1 Short run sig
integration integration
Mons Tournai 2,80 -0,46 -8,68 ** 10,19 ** -0,35 -8,63 ** 16,40 **
Brussels Tournai 15,00 -1,54 -7,41 ** -2,60 -0,29 -7,81 ** 18,77 **
Ieper Tournai 0,50 -0,34 -8,01 ** 15,55 ** -0,33 -8,33 ** 17,10 **
Charlero Mons 6,30 -0,42 -7,29 ** 10,07 ** -0,21 -6,49 ** 24,05 **
Namur Mons 4,80 -0,19 -4,88 ** 20,80 ** -0,13 -4,87 ** 32,97 **
Mechelen Mons 5,50 -0,37 -6,43 ** 10,95 ** -0,21 -6,31 ** 24,03 **
Antwerp Mons 3,90 -0,30 -6,01 ** 14,02 ** -0,21 -6,40 ** 24,22 **
Ghent Mons 13,00 -0,41 -4,72 ** 6,79 ** -0,12 -4,84 ** 34,35 **
Ath Binche 2,28 -0,50 -8,56 ** 8,56 ** -0,38 -9,14 ** 15,00 **
Namur Binche 5,80 -0,33 -6,02 ** 12,22 ** -0,17 -5,80 ** 27,54 **
Brussels Binche 2,50 -0,38 -7,65 ** 12,48 ** -0,29 -7,77 ** 19,44 **
Charlero Ath 10,00 -0,64 -6,66 ** 3,75 ** -0,24 -6,90 ** 22,37 **
Namur Ath 6,50 -0,33 -5,97 ** 12,12 ** -0,16 -5,45 ** 29,47 **
Kortrijk Ath 3,00 -0,24 -6,45 ** 20,43 ** -0,19 -6,25 ** 25,96 **
Leuven Charlero 2,96 -0,91 -12,36 ** 1,22 -0,58 -11,19 ** 8,22 **
Tienen Brussels 17,30 -0,94 -6,26 ** 0,40 -0,12 -4,97 ** 36,01 **
Antwerp Brussels 1,00 -0,37 -7,90 ** 13,45 ** -0,32 -8,30 ** 17,47 **
Bruges Brussels 3,00 -0,15 -4,62 ** 26,18 ** -0,12 -4,66 ** 35,60 **
Mechelen Tienen 20,01 -1,39 -6,74 ** -1,89 -0,10 -4,32 ** 40,96 **
Lier Mechelen 1,21 -0,36 -7,86 ** 13,97 ** -0,31 -8,05 ** 18,20 **
Leuven Antwerp 1,73 -0,56 -9,57 ** 7,52 ** -0,43 -9,18 ** 12,37 **
Leuven Lier 6,01 -0,31 -6,08 ** 13,53 ** -0,15 -4,91 ** 29,00 **
Bruges St Niklaas 1,00 -0,18 -5,76 ** 26,24 ** -0,16 -5,59 ** 28,69 **
Veurne Ghent 3,01 -0,13 -4,64 ** 31,05 ** -0,10 -4,45 ** 38,48 **
Leuven Ghent 8,00 -0,24 -5,47 ** 17,32 ** -0,12 -4,38 ** 33,60 **
Ieper Veurne 1,00 -0,27 -6,97 ** 18,84 ** -0,25 -7,07 ** 21,74 **
Kortrijk Veurne 2,50 -0,34 -7,47 ** 14,50 ** -0,26 -7,31 ** 20,60 **
